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SCHOLARLY REFLECTIONS 
THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Archibald Cox. 1 Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin. rg87. Pp. 378. $rg.gs. 
In the prologue to The Court and the Constitution, Professor Ar-
chibald Cox recalls a conversation he had in 1963 with Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Kennedy. Governor George Wallace had just informed 
Kennedy that Alabama teachers intended to defy the Supreme Court's 
recent decision that prohibited public schools from opening the day 
with prayer, 2 and he demanded to know whether the federal govern-
ment would send in the army to enforce the decision as it planned to 
do to for Brown v. Board of Education. 3 Cox reports that his advice 
to Kennedy - that there was no actual decree against any Alabama 
officials that could be enforced - was technically correct, but lame. 
Cox wishes today that he had answered that our Constitution "works, 
our liberties are protected, and our society is free because officials, 
individuals, and the people as a whole realize that liberty for the weak 
depends upon the rule of law and the rule of law depends upon 
voluntary compliance" (p. rs). Professor Cox need no longer harbor 
any regrets; his most recent work on "constitutional adjudication" (p. 
343) - as he refers to judicial review - eloquently states this point. 
The Court and the Constitution reiterates the message that "[t]he 
roots of constitutionalism lie in the hearts of the people" (p. rs). The 
legitimacy of any decision is determined by how responsive the Su-
preme Court is to what the nation, given distance and a cooler tem-
perament, would assent to (p. 377). Professor Cox illustrates this point 
by chronicling many of the Court's weighty constitutional decisions 
over the past two centuries. His coverage is sweeping, from the 
establishment of judicial supremacy and economic liberty to affirma-
tive action and abortion. 
The bulk of the book is historical in nature. In each doctrinal 
area, Cox explains the evolution of the law. He breathes life into 
dusty cases by vividly describing the actors and issues at stake in 
their historical context. His approach is best seen in his discussion of 
the evolving relationship between free speech and national security. 
The question of what "relationship between words of political or social 
advocacy and unlawful acts will deprive the speaker of the protection 
I Visiting Professor of Law, Boston University; Carl M. Loeb University Professor of Law 
Emeritus, Harvard University. Professor Cox became the first Watergate Special Prosecutor in 
May 1973. . 
2 See School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
3 347 u.s. 483 (1954)-
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of the First Amendment" (p. 2 rs) arises in many situations. The 
pressures, however, "are most intense and the stakes are highest when 
the criticism is of the Administration's conduct. of a war" (p. 2 IS), 
when nationalist sentiment runs deepest and tolerance is often in short 
supply. It is in this context that Cox locates the foundations of the 
first amendment, for "it is speech of a political nature that government 
most often seeks to restrict, and therefore the courts most often have 
occasion to defend" (p. 2 II). 
Professor Cox traces the development of first amendment jurispru-
dence and its governing "clear and present danger" test from World 
War I to the present against the backdrop of changing national sen-
timent and priorities. The clear and present danger standard was first 
formulated in 1919 by Justice Holmes in his opinions upholding the 
conviction of Eugene Debs and two others4 for violating section 3 of 
the Espionage Act, which prohibited wartime attempts to incite in-
subordination or obstruct military recruitment (pp. 2 r8-19). Debs had 
given a speech - transcribed by a government stenographer who had 
been sent to record it - that encouraged his followers not to worry 
about charges of treason. "Be true to yourself," he told the gathering, 
"and you cannot be a traitor to any cause on earth" (p. 2 r8). Although 
the statement fell short of actual incitement of unlawful acts, the 
Court held that it was unprotected speech because of its probable 
effect of inciting a violation of the law. The result of this holding 
was that "[l]ittle constitutional protection was left for wartime critics 
of government policies" (p. 2 19). 
The Court's holdings in these three cases are best understood in 
their historical context. The World War I era was one of "feverish 
demand for 'roo percent Americanism,"' a time "[w]hen an enraged 
sailor shot a spectator who refused to rise for the national anthem" 
and "the crowd cheered and applauded" (p. 216). Later periods, 
however, displayed greater tolerance. "The atmosphere of the New 
Deal," according to Cox, "encouraged the expansion of civil liberties. 
Opponents of World War II were fewer and fared better than Eugene 
Debs and the critics of World War I" (p. 221). The Supreme Court 
came to adopt a new understanding of the clear and present danger 
test,5 one that was first enunciated by Justices Brandeis and Holmes 
in dissents to earlier decisions:6 "no danger flowing from speech can 
be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil appre-
hended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity 
for full discussion. "7 
4 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 2II (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 1 52 (1919). 
s See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
6 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., 
dissenting). 
7 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring). 
BOOK NOTE 
During the Cold War period, greater intolerance and the fear that 
a Communist conspiracy would infiltrate the government again led to 
more stringent restraints on speech. In 1947, Eugene Dennis, a Com-
munist Party member, was convicted of violating the Smith Act by 
advocating the violent overthrow of the government. In Dennis v. 
United States, 8 the Court upheld the conviction and returned to a 
less protective definition of the clear and present danger standard: "In 
each case, [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as 
is necessary to avoid the danger. "9 Professor Cox believes that this 
formulation was "manifestly inconsistent with the views of Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis as expressed in Whitney" (p. 224). In addition, 
he claims that the Court failed to justify the factual foundations for 
its holding, never explaining why Dennis' particular speech was denied 
protection (p. 224). Professor Cox concludes that "differences of tem-
perament, broad impressions concerning the forces at work in the 
country and the world, and inarticulate hopes and fears played larger 
parts in these conflicting judgments than hard-headed factual analysis" 
(p. 2 24). Although judges strive for impartiality and reasoned prin-
ciples, they "sometimes render decisions under pressures of war that 
they may come to doubt in calmer years" (p. 225). 
Despite the shortcomings of cases like Dennis, Professor Cox as-
serts that judicial review provides the best protection for rights that 
may be threatened by the emotional pressures of national conflict. 
Although the judicial pendulum may swing, it does so "less wildly 
and in a shorter arc than public or legislative opinion" (p. 226). 
Moreover, the scope of judicial review is not unlimited. To be legit-
imate, the "aspirations voiced by the Court must be those that the 
community is willing not only to avow but in the end to live by" (p. 
377). This standard requires much tolerance and cooperation, for the 
Court cannot physically force every citizen to obey its edicts (p. 374). 
Compliance with the Court's decisions derives from a quality inherent 
and unique to our citizens, for "[d]evotion to the Constitution and the 
rule of law go hand in hand among the American people" (p. 26). 
Cox's thesis can be evaluated in the context of the school deseg-
regation cases. Professor Cox notes that despite the importance of 
Brown v. Board of Education, 10 the Court's practical ability to enforce 
a decision not accepted by portions of the populace was limited and 
required time and effort. "The process was slow; the local authorities 
often dragged their feet; protracted litigation was often necessary to 
secure full relief" (pp. 265-66). After Brown, fourteen years elapsed 
before the Court in Green v. County School Board11 ruled that school 
8 341 u.s. 494 (1951). 
9 Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
10 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
11 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
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boards were under a duty to take "whatever steps might be necessary" 
to eliminate racial segregation "root and branch" from the school 
systems (p. 263). 12 Another three years passed before the Court in 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education13 explained how 
far those steps could go, upholding a remedy that included the use of 
"zoning, pairing, and grouping techniques"14 as part of a mandate to 
"eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed 
segregation"15 (pp. 264-65). Cox's theory would explain the delay in 
achieving meaningful results in the desegregation context by empha-
sizing the need to attain popular consensus before working such fun-
damental change in the social fabric of the country. "To go further 
-to impose the Court's own wiser choice- is illegitimate" (p. 377). 
But this approach is paradoxical. On the one hand, Cox envisions 
a countermajoritarian role for the Court. He concludes that because 
questions involving fundamental rights should be resolved not by force 
or popular pressure but by reason and a sense of justice, the Court is 
the proper institution to protect these rights from governmental 
oppression (p. 25). On the other hand, the legitimacy of any decision 
depends on majoritarian principles - whether a particular decision 
would strike a responsive chord in the public "equivalent to the con-
sent of the governed" (p. 377). Cox attempts to resolve this paradox 
by directing the Court to look beyond present standards of accepta-
bility and to envision what Americans, in an atmosphere of greater 
tolerance, would accept. "[W]hile the opinions of the Court can some-
times be the voice of the spirit reminding us of our better selves, the 
roots of such decisions must be already in the people" (p. 377). This 
standard is remarkably subjective. Under it, the legitimacy of any 
decision can be assessed only retrospectively - after the people have 
had a chance to determine whether they can live by it. Cox's solution, 
however, is no more unworkable than pure noninterpretivism; ulti-
mately, as Cox admits, it requires faith in the "delicate symbiotic 
relationship" between the Supreme Court and the people (p. 377). 
The Court and the Constitution is an illuminating book, but it is 
better suited for the layperson than for the student of constitutional 
theory. Its appeal lies in Professor Cox's ability to interweave politi-
cal, historical, and legal descriptions with rich personal insights gar-
nered during a distinguished career. Regrettably, Professor Cox does 
not elaborate his theory of constitutional adjudication in detail. Per-
haps ultimately scholars suffer from the same shortcomings as the 
justices and must find consolation in the fact that "reaching for ideals 
is part of reality, even though our reach exceeds our grasp" (p. 26). 
12 I d. at 437-38. 
13 402 U.S. I (I97I). 
14 !d. at 9· 
15 Id. at IS. 
